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ABSTRACT
The widespread adoption of Location-Based Services (LBSs)
has come with controversy about privacy. While leverag-
ing location information leads to improving services through
geo-contextualization, it rises privacy concerns as new knowl-
edge can be inferred from location records, such as home/work
places, habits or religious beliefs. To overcome this problem,
several Location Privacy Protection Mechanisms (LPPMs)
have been proposed in the literature these last years. How-
ever, every mechanism comes with its own configuration pa-
rameters that directly impact the privacy guarantees and
the resulting utility of protected data. In this context, it
can be difficult for a non-expert system designer to choose
appropriate configuration parameters to use according to the
expected privacy and utility.
In this paper, we present a framework enabling the easy
configuration of LPPMs. To achieve that, our framework
performs an offline, in-depth automated analysis of LPPMs
to provide the formal relationship between their configura-
tion parameters and both privacy and the utility metrics.
This framework is modular: by using different metrics, a sys-
tem designer is able to fine-tune her LPPM according to her
expected privacy and utility guarantees (i.e., the guarantee
itself and the level of this guarantee). To illustrate the capa-
bility of our framework, we analyse Geo-Indistinguishability
(a well known differentially private LPPM) and we provide
the formal relationship between its  configuration parame-
ter and two privacy and utility metrics.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy → Pseudonymity, anonymity
and untraceability; Privacy-preserving protocols; File
system security;
1. INTRODUCTION
Location Based Services (LBSs) such as navigation or rec-
ommendation applications have been widely adopted by peo-
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ple using mobile devices. Although location-aware systems
have greatly improved the quality of many services by intro-
ducing geo-contextualization, such systems rise important
concerns about privacy.
Indeed, a collection of mobility traces (a set of times-
tamped locations reflecting the user’s moving activity) can
reveal many sensitive information about its user such as
home and work places, favorite restaurants, religious lean-
ing, or the individuals she met. To overcome this privacy is-
sue, many Location Privacy Protection Mechanisms (LPPMs)
have been proposed in the last decade. However, the effec-
tiveness of these mechanisms usually rely on the tuning of
a set of configuration parameters, often with a large range
of possible values. In addition, this tuning depends on the
expected privacy guarantee and utility of the resulting pro-
tected data, which form two conflicting assessment dimen-
sions. Consequently, this parametrization task can be diffi-
cult for a non-expert system designer.
Few works have been done to automatically assess LPPMs
in terms of privacy and utility as well as to assist a system
designer in their configuration. Most of the existing LPPMs
are not automated and focus on privacy guarantees [1, 3].
To the best of our knowledge, ALP [4] is the only solution
enabeling to address this problem. Specifically, ALP uses a
greedy solution to possibly make the configuration parame-
ters converge to values which aim to maximize or minimize
given privacy or utility metrics. As far as we know, no solu-
tion provides the formal relationship between configuration
parameters and privacy and utility metrics as we propose.
In this paper, we present a framework which aims to help
in the fine-tuning of LPPMs according to a set of expecta-
tions in term of privacy and utility defined by a system de-
signer. To achieve that, our solution adopts an automated
approach which performs an in-depth analysis of LPPMs,
and provides the formal relationship between their config-
uration parameters and both privacy and utility metrics.
This framework is modular: by using different metrics it is
possible to adapt the provided model to specific privacy and
utility guarantees.
Through a real example, we illustrate the capability of
our framework to configure Geo-Indistinguishability [2], a
well known LPPM based on differential privacy, according
to privacy and utility metrics.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
To illustrate the problem related to the configuration of a
LPPM and the capability of our framework to solve it, we
consider the case of using Geo-indistinguishability [2] (GEO-
ǫ (in meters−1, log scale)
10 -4 10 -3 10 -2 10 -1 10 0
P
ri
va
cy
m
et
ri
c
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
(a) Privacy
ǫ (in meters−1, log scale)
10 -4 10 -3 10 -2 10 -1 10 0
U
ti
li
ty
m
et
ri
c
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
(b) Utility
Figure 1: GEO-I configuration parameter  according to
privacy and utility metrics
I for short) to protect a whole dataset containing mobility
traces of taxi drivers around San Franciso, with objectives
in terms of privacy and utility.
GEO-I [2] follows the differential privacy model and is
specifically designed to protect mobility data. To protect
raw data, this LPPM adds random noise drawn from a
Laplace distribution to the actual user location. GEO-I
is parametrized by an  parameter (expressed in meters−1),
quantifying the amount of noise to add (the lower the , the
higher the noise).
As privacy objective, we consider the retrieval in the pro-
tected data of at most 10% of the Points of interest (POIs) of
users (meaningful locations where a user made a significant
stop). This objective is evaluated through a privacy met-
ric which quantifies the proportion of actual POIs retrieved
from the protected data for each user.
As utility objective, we consider maintaining a similar lo-
cation precision at the scale of a city block. More precisely,
the difference between the area coverage of users in the ac-
tual mobility traces and their protected counterpart is ex-
pected to remain about the size of a city block block and no
less accurate. This objective is quantified through a utility
metric.
The challenge here for a system designer is to correctly
configure the  of GEO-I to ensure that the expected objec-
tives are respected. Figure 1 shows the level of privacy and
utility according to different values of  (the vertical lines
shows zones where metrics are not saturated). Results show
that the privacy metric rapidly changes from 0 to 0.4 with
an  from 0.007 to 0.08, respectively (Figure 1a). The utility
metric, in turn, evolves more slowly on a larger range from
0.2 to 1 with an  from 10−4 to 1, respectively (Figure 1b).
Consequently, to ensure the expected privacy and utility ob-
jectives, the system designer has to choose carefully its . In
our case, a  = 0.01 minimizes the privacy while maximizing
the utility. In other words, with l = 0.01 we ensure to a
user that no more than 10% of her POIs can be retrieved
while ensuring that 80% of her requests will concern the city
block where she is.
3. OVERVIEW OF THE FRAMEWORK
Our framework proposes an automated approach to cor-
rectly configure LPPMs’ parameters for given objectives in
terms of privacy and utility, using a mathematical model of
the LPPM behavior. Our solution proceeds in three auto-
mated steps:
1. First, the system needs to be defined: (1) the objec-
tive metrics for privacy (Pr) and utility (Ut), (2) the
LPPM configuration parameters pi and their range of
values, and (3) the properties of the dataset di that are
likely to influence privacy and utility metrics (i.e., re-
flecting impactfully characteristics of users such as the
uniqueness). All these properties pi, di are soundly
chosen using a principal component analysis. For in-
stance, in our illustration based on GEO-I, Pr mea-
sures the proportion of POIs that can be retrieved, Ut
quantifies the difference in the service area coverage,
only the parameter  configures the LPPM, and no
dataset properties is considered.
2. Then comes the modeling phase: experiments are au-
tomatically run where parameters pi and di vary in
turn while evaluation metrics are measured. Based
on this data, a mathematical relationship between pri-
vacy and utility metrics, configuration parameters, and
dataset properties is computed as an invertible func-
tion: (
Pr
Ut
)
= f(p1, . . . , pn, d1, . . . , dm) (1)
3. Finally, the LPPM configuration (i.e. the value of pi) is
computed by inverting the f function, using the spec-
ified privacy and utility objectives and the evaluation
of dataset properties di.
For instance, in our illustration based on GEO-I, Pr and
Ut only depend on parameter . If we focus only on the
interval where  impacts the privacy and utility metrics (i.e.
between the vertical lines in Figure 1) we can approximate
the experimental curves with the following linear equations:
log() =
Pr − a
b
=
Ut− α
β
,
with a = 0.84, b = 0.17, α = 1.21 and β = 0.09.
(2)
Hence, to ensure that her privacy and utility objectives
are met, a system designer can easily leverage this model to
determine the appropriate value of . Specifically, to guar-
antee 10% privacy, configuring  = 0.01 ensures 80% utility.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a framework that enables easy
and automated configuration of LPPMs according to pri-
vacy and utility objectives. Our preliminary results on the
LPPM GEO-I show promising results as for the control of
 configuration parameter. Our future work will focus in
testing other LPPMs and datasets, we also plan to extend
our framework with more metrics and parameters.
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